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The ‘Paradox of Fear’ in Classical Indian Buddhism1 
 
Abstract 
The Nikāya Suttas frequently mention the concept of fear (bhaya) and related 
synonyms. This concept does not receive much scholarly attention by subsequent 
Buddhist philosophers. Recent scholars identify a ‘paradox of fear’ in several 
traditions of classical Indian Buddhism (Brekke 1999, Finnigan 2019, Giustarini 
2012). Each scholar points out, in their respective textual contexts, that fear is 
evaluated in two ways; one positive and the other negative. Brekke calls this the 
“double role” of fear (1999: 443). Each also identify fear as purposely elicited to 
motivate acts aimed at achieving fearlessness, where freedom from fear is 
characteristic of nibbāna. They all find this puzzling. Finnigan asks: “Why would 
one purposefully incite fear if one’s goal is its elimination?” (2019: 221). Giustarini 
says that fear has a “contradictory nature” (2012: 513); Brekke calls it “the paradox 
of fear” (1999: 442). This article introduces the ‘paradox of fear’ as it appears in the 
Bodhicaryāvatāra of Śāntideva and the Nikāya suttas. It then critically examines 
Brekke and Giustarini’s proposed solutions. It argues that they get some things right 
in ways that are both supported by the Nikāyas and relevant to Śāntideva but that 
they leave some important questions unanswered. The article contends that these 
questions are best answered if fear is analysed as appropriate when its objects are 
related to karma and rebirth.  
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The early teachings of the Buddha, as recorded in the Nikāya suttas of the Pāli canon, 
frequently mention the concept of fear (bhaya, P., Skt.) and related synonyms. They also treat 
fearlessness as a characteristic of the goal of Buddhist practice, the achievement of nibbāna (P. 
nirvāṇa, Skt.). The concept of fear does not receive much scholarly attention by subsequent 
Buddhist philosophers, however. The Abhidhamma (P., Abhidharma, Skt.) tradition that 
emerged in the centuries after the Buddha’s death sought to systematise the Buddha’s teachings 
into a complete and exhaustive theory of the mind and reality, with a special focus on his 
psychological claims. But the main texts in this tradition barely mention fear. This is surprising. 
 Some recent scholars critically examine Buddhist views on fear. Giuliano Giustarini (2012) 
examines remarks about fear found in the Nikāya suttas and Theravāda Abhidhamma 
commentaries. Torkel Brekke (1999) also considers the Vinaya Piṭaka, the Milindapañha, and 
some Mahāyāna sūtras.2 Bronwyn Finnigan (2019) analyses remarks made by Śāntideva in his 
Bodhicaryāvatāra. Despite these diverse textual contexts, these scholars identify the same 
puzzle in the Buddhist use and evaluation of fear. Each scholar notes that fear is evaluated in 
 
1 Many thanks to Felmon Davis and the helpful suggestions of an anonymous reviewer. 
2 Brekke also contextualises Buddhist views on fear in the history of Indian religious thought, reminding us that 
“fear is a vast subject in Indian literature” (1999: 440) and that “there are clear parallels” between Buddhism, 
Jainism and Hinduism in viewing “freedom from fear as a characteristic of the goal of religious striving” (446). 
Brekke also argues that “the same paradox of fear can be found in Jainism” (443) but thinks that Buddhism is 
distinctive in its use of “fear as a means to religious striving” (454).  
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two ways; one positive and the other negative. Brekke calls this the “double role” of fear (1999: 
443). Each also recognise that fear is purposely elicited or recommended to motivate acts aimed 
at achieving fearlessness, where freedom from fear is characteristic of nibbāna. They all find 
this puzzling. Finnigan asks: “Why would one purposefully incite fear if one’s goal is its 
elimination? In logical terms, why generate p if the goal is ~p?” (2019: 221). Giustarini says 
that fear has a “contradictory nature” (2012: 513); Brekke calls it “the paradox of fear” (1999: 
442). While, strictly speaking, I don't think there is a logical paradox here, I agree that there is 
something puzzling about the way Buddhists talk about and use fear that needs explaining.  
 This article begins by introducing the ‘paradox of fear’ (stated in inverted commas) as it 
appears in the Bodhicaryāvatāra of Śāntideva (1) and the Nikāya suttas (2), with some 
reference to the commentaries of Buddhaghoṣa. It then critically examines Brekke and 
Giustarini’s proposed solutions (3). It argues that they get some things right in ways that are 
both supported by the Nikāyas and relevant to Śāntideva but that they leave some important 
questions unanswered. The article concludes by arguing that these questions are best answered 
if fear is analysed as appropriate when its objects are related to karma and rebirth (4). 
 
1 Śāntideva on fear and taking refuge 
In Chapters 2 & 7 of the Bodhicaryāvatāra (BCA), Śāntideva makes a series of provocative 
remarks aimed at inciting fear in his audience to motivate them to ‘take refuge’ in the 
Bodhisattvas (“the mighty Protectors of the world” BCA 2.48). He also identifies fearlessness 
as the goal of this practice. He writes:3 
 
Night and day, without respite, more life is lost. It never gets longer. Surely, will I not 
die? (2.40) 
Though here laid on my bed, though in the midst of family, it is alone that I must endure 
the agony of the throes of death. (2.41) 
Even someone taken away today to have a limb cut off writhes, throat parched, gaze 
wretched. He sees the world in a completely different way. (2.44) 
But that is nothing to the feverish horror which grips me, covered in my own uncontrolled 
excrement, as Death’s terrifying messengers stand over me (2.45) 
When Death is sizing you up and at every turn the way is blocked, how can it please you 
to eat? How can you sleep? How make love? (7.6) 
Realizing you are like a captive fish, how right it is for you to be afraid right now? How 
much more so when you have committed evil action and are faced with the intense 
agonies of hell? (7.11) 
With cowering glances, I search the four directions for deliverance. What saint will 
deliver me from this great fear? (2.46) 
 
3 I am here copying the verses cited in Finnigan (2019). It is not a continuous passage, but a series of verses 
selected and ordered for the purposes of discussion. 
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Right now, I go for refuge to the mighty Protectors of the world, who have undertaken the 
care of the world, the Conquerors who remove all fear (2.48) 
Trembling with fear I give myself to Samantabhadra and again, freely I give myself to 
Mañjughoṣa (2.50) 
I have transgressed your command. Now, at seeing the danger, terrified, I go to you for 
refuge. Destroy the danger quickly  (2.54) 
I give myself wholly to the Conquerors and to their sons… 
 You take possession of me. I become fearless  (2.8-9) 
These verses are not only vividly poetic but also philosophically intriguing as they appear to 
assume competing attitudes to fear. On the one hand, Śāntideva explicitly endorses fear as 
appropriate (“how right it is for you to be afraid right now” 7.11) and the graphic content in 
these verses seems positively aimed at inciting fear in his audience. The ostensive purpose for 
this is to motivate a certain response to the object of fear which, in the context of these verses, 
is the karmic suffering anticipated to follow death. And the specific response Śāntideva seeks 
to motivate is that of “taking refuge” (śaraṇaṃ, Skt.) in the “assembly of Bodhisattvas” (2.49). 
In apparent contrast to this positively endorsed and utilized sense of fear, Śāntideva goes on to 
describe the outcome of taking refuge as having “become fearless” (2.9). This is puzzling since 
it implies that fear is (also) a negative mental state to be removed. If fear is a negative mental 
state to be removed, why incite it in the first place? If it has positive motivational force, why 
would we need deliverance from it?  
 Before discussing this further, two technical ideas need to be explained: karmic suffering 
and the bodhisattva. What I am calling ‘karmic suffering’ is the suffering anticipated to be 
experienced in the next life after death as “the inevitable result of wrong” (2.63). It assumes 
the concept of rebirth or cyclic existence (saṃsāra Skt. P.) as well as the laws of karma (Skt.). 
Śāntideva, like the Buddha and most scholars in classical India, accepted a cosmology of 
multiple realms or modes of existence into which sentient beings are reborn in a continuous 
cycle, each defined in terms of their distinct modes of suffering. Where one is reborn is driven 
by the law of karma which operates over moral action; good actions generate karmic merit, 
bad actions generate karmic demerit. An agent's accumulated karmic debt determines their next 
mode of existence, and it causes some auspicious and inauspicious events to occur in that life.4 
It also partially explains the nature and fact of their present existence as well as some of the 
auspicious and inauspicious events that occur in that life. While each realm or mode of 
existence is impermanent, some (such as the heavenly and hell realms) are said to last for 
extreme lengths of time (SN1.6.1.1, Braarvig 2009). Being reborn as human is conceived as 
the best destination because it affords the opportunity to learn and practice the Buddha’s 
teachings and thereby end the cycle of rebirth (Harvey 2000). 
 Śāntideva is a Mahāyāna Buddhist. Mahāyāna Buddhism distinctively recognizes certain 
texts as authoritative recordings of the Buddha’s teaching in addition to those contained in the 
Pāli canon. The concept of a bodhisattva is central to this tradition of Buddhism. A bodhisattva 
is someone who has committed themselves to forego personal liberation from cyclic existence 
 
4 I say ‘some’ because Buddhism recognises other forms of causation and does not explain all possible happenings 
in terms of karmic causation. 
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and to be continuously reborn for the purpose of relieving the suffering of all sentient beings. 
This commitment is said to be motivated by their great compassion for the suffering of others, 
and its expression in action is informed by moral virtues or perfections. Not only is the 
bodhisattva thought to be an ideal to which one should aspire, it is an ideal that many Mahāyāna 
Buddhists think is instantiated by a community of divine beings; the “assembly of 
Bodhisattvas” (2.49).  
 In the above verses, Śāntideva seems to elicit fear of karmic suffering to motivate his 
audience to take refuge in this assembly and thereby achieve fearlessness. How is taking refuge 
in the protection of bodhisattvas meant to bring about a transition from fear to fearlessness? 
Why does Śāntideva recommend taking refuge rather than some other remedy, such as 
mindfulness5 or doing good deeds since the object of fear in his verses is karmic suffering, 
karmic suffering is caused by wrongdoing (7.11), good deeds produce merit, and Śāntideva 
himself claims that “merit alone is a defense” (2.42). A possible response is that these verses 
describe the moment of death, at which point there isn't time to do anything else. But 
Śāntideva’s intended audience for these verses is presumably not at the point of death. Why 
does he motivate them (us!) to take refuge in the Bodhisattvas? To answer this question, it 
would help to first examine the nature and function of fear in Buddhist thought. While not 
aiming to provide an exhaustive and complete analysis of fear, this article will take a first step 
by clarifying some of these puzzling dimensions of Buddhist views on fear.  
 
2 The ‘Paradox of Fear’ in the Nikāya suttas 
Śāntideva’s use and remarks about fear in BCA have the following narrative structure:  
 (1) fear is an endorsed motive for action 
 (2) taking refuge is an endorsed motivated act, and  
 (3) fearlessness is the goal state of this motivated act.  
This narrative structure generates a puzzle. (3) assumes that fear is a negative state to be 
removed by the action endorsed in (2). (1) positively endorses fear as motive for (2). Taken 
together, these claims both positively endorse and negatively eschew fear, which seems to be 
an evaluative contradiction. They also treat fear as the motive for its own removal, which seems 
to be self-undermining. Can this combination of views, (1-3), be consistently explained and 
the paradox thereby resolved?  
 It might be tempting to localize the puzzle to Śāntideva and BCA. However, Brekke (1999) 
and Giustarini (2012) provide reasons to think that the same puzzle can be found in the Nikāya 
Suttas, the Theravāda Abhidhamma commentaries, the Vinaya Piṭaka, the Milindapañha, as 
well as the Mahāyāna sūtras. This suggests not only that the ‘paradox of fear’ is prevalent in 
the Buddhist tradition but that there might also be a wider body of texts from which to derive 
an exegetical solution. In what follows I will substantiate this suggestion in the Nikāya suttas, 
with occasional reference to Buddhagoṣa.  
 Buddhist remarks about fear occur in a soteriological context. A framing assumption of this 
context is the Buddha’s teaching of the Four Noble Truths. Buddhist philosophers debate how 
 
5 Later in Chapter 5 Śāntideva does propose mindfulness (smṛti) as an appropriate remedy to fear “since all fears 
and incomparable sufferings arise from the mind alone” (5.6). The question remains, however, why Śāntideva 
(also) considers taking refuge to be a relevant remedy. 
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best to interpret and elaborate these teachings. Broadly speaking, most agree that the first 
‘truth’ articulates the truth or fact of suffering; the second analyses its causes and conditions; 
the third affirms that suffering can cease and thereby nibbāna6  achieved, and the fourth 
provides a ‘path’ or guideline for living the relevant way of life and producing this outcome. 
This path is known as the Eightfold Path and it prescribes, amongst other things, engaging in 
mindfulness and other forms of contemplative practice as well as cognitive or philosophical 
analysis aimed at attaining the ‘right view’ (MN9, MN10, MN28, MN141).  
 The Nikāyas frequently treat fear (bhaya) as a kind and cause of suffering as well as an 
impediment to be overcome on the path to nibbāna. This is clearest in relation to the Buddha’s 
recommendation that his disciples (bhikkhus) meditate in solitary forest seclusion. There was 
much to potentially fear in the “remote jungle thicket resting places in the forest” of ancient 
India (MN4.2). One might be killed by a wild animal or die from an animal bite or sting; one 
might die from personal injury or from eating poisonous food; one might be murdered by 
bandits or die as the result of disease (AN5.77). Many suttas address a concern that these perils 
may cause fear, dread (bherava), fright (uttāsa), terror (chambhitatta), and ‘hair-raising’ horror 
(lomahaṃsa) to arise in a forest disciple, disrupting their concentration and obstructing the 
obtaining of wisdom (MN4, MN128, SN1.15). The Bhayabheravasutta diagnoses these fears 
as caused by impure bodily, verbal, or mental acts and states, such as a lack of wisdom, lack 
of persistence, restlessness, uncertainty, and doubt. “Whatever fears arise,” says the 
Bahūdhatukasutta, “[they] all arise because of the fool, not because of the wise man. The wise 
man brings no fear.” (MN115.2). Not only is fear said to be caused by impurities of conduct 
and mind, but fear (at least in the form of chambhitatta) is said to be a mental imperfection 
(uppakilesa) due to its negative influence on meditative practice (MN128.27). Since the 
Buddha does not have these defects, he is said to find solace in solitary practice (MN4). 
“When…I understood that… fear is an imperfection of the mind” he tells Anuruddha in the 
Uppakilesasutta, “I abandoned fear.” (MN128.30). 
 The Sigalākasutta also identifies fear as one of four causes of bad action from which one 
must refrain (DN31.5). Several texts evaluate actions and their products negatively if motivated 
by fear. Gifts given from fear, for example, are deemed unworthy (AN8.31). The monastic 
community is instructed not to appoint someone as assigner of meals if they are motivated by 
fear (AN5.272). Those who “never yield” to the motive of fear are said to “grow in goodness 
and repute like the moon at waxing-time” (DN31.6). There is also a social dimension to the 
negative motivational influence of fear. Fear and timidity (sārajjaṃ) are frequently discussed 
in the context of public speaking. The Book of Nines identifies “fear of timidity in assemblies” 
as one of “five fears” a disciple must transcend (AN9.5.4).7 The Brahmajālasutta tells us that 
fear of uttering a mistake when uncertain (‘fearing to lie’) can cause a person to be evasive 
(DN1.2.21). A Buddha, however, “sees no grounds” on which he could be reproached for 
speaking falsely and so, even in immense social contexts that include hundreds of assemblies 
of gods and evil beings, the Buddha “roars his lion's roar” and abides “in safety, fearlessness 
(abhayappatto), and intrepidity” (MN12.23)  
 
6 All terms cited from the Nikāyas will be in Pāli. 
7 The others are fear of [loss of] livelihood, fear of disrepute, fear of death, and fear of a bad destination (AN9.5) 
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 The Nikāyas also frequently treat fear and fearlessness as synonyms for suffering and its 
cessation. They metaphorically characterise the Buddhist soteriological path as a journey 
across an expanse of water, the near side of which is dangerous and fearful and the further 
shore safe and free from fear (MN22.13-14, SN35.238). Some Mahāyāna sūtras also treat fear 
as a synonym of suffering (see Siks. 4.70, 5.104). Buddhagoṣa, goes so far as to redescribe the 
four noble truths in terms of fear, the origin of fear, the freedom from fear and the means to 
attain it (Vism. 87.11).8 According to the Nikāyas, nibbāna is “inaccessible to fear” (SN8.8) 
and those who reach it are “beyond all fear and hate, they have escaped all suffering” 
(MN130.30). A Buddha is said to be “altogether fearless” (MN56.29); “restrained without fear, 
not restrained by fear” (MN47.9). Disciples are thus encouraged to persist in their solitary 
practice and become a “conqueror of fear and dread” (MN6.8), “transcending fear and dread” 
(MN119.8) whenever they arise, without fear and dread conquering them. The aim is to be 
“freed from fear, liberated in the fearless” (SN6.13).  
 In apparent contrast, the Aṅguttara Nikāya contains extensive lists of “future fears” or 
“future perils” (anāgatabhayāni) on which forest disciples are positively advised to “dwell 
heedful, ardent and resolute” (AN5.77). They include the dangers of solitary forest seclusion 
mentioned earlier (being killed by wild animals etc.) as well as the negative impacts of famine, 
catastrophes, schisms in the Buddhist monastic community, and various corruptions of the 
Buddha’s teachings and discipline (AN5.77-80). More broadly, disciples are advised to dwell 
on the perils of birth, old age, illness, and death (AN4.119); on the perils of fire, of floods, of 
kings, of bandits (AN4.120); on the perils of self-reproach, of reproach from others, of 
punishment, and of bad rebirth (AN4.120); and, on the results of criminal misconduct and 
misconduct of the body, speech or mind (AN2.1). Moreover, a central theme of the Majjima 
Nikāya involves reflecting on the perils of lust or sensual pleasure (kāma, see MN45, MN66). 
In general, disciples are advised:  
[Y]ou should train yourselves thus: ‘We will fear [bhaya] the fault pertaining to the 
present life; we will fear [bhaya] the fault pertaining to the future life. We will be fearful 
[bhīro] of faults and see peril [bhaya] in faults. It is in such a way that you should train 
yourselves. It is to be expected that one who is fearful of faults and sees peril in faults 
will be freed from all faults. (AN2.1) 
The immediate purpose of dwelling on these objects is to generate a ‘keen perception of their 
danger’ (bhayasaññā) (AN4.244). This ‘keen perception’ of danger is either a cause or kind of 
fear. Graphic depictions of these perils reinforce the idea that a psychological transition - from 
reflection to fear - is intended to occur (see AN2.1). Moreover, the same term, bhaya, is used 
to denote both fear and danger, which suggests that the relation between perceiving danger and 
fear is not merely causal; to keenly perceive or construe some object as dangerous is to fear it.  
 Many passages further suggest that, in coming to keenly perceive some object as dangerous 
and thus fear it, it is expected that a disciple will be motivated towards preventative conduct. 
 
8 This might be prefigured in the Devatāsaṃyutta: “‘The straightway’ that path is called, and ‘fearless’ is its 
destination. The chariot is called ‘unrattling,’. Fitted with wheels of wholesome states.” (SN1.46). According to 
Buddhagoṣa’s commentary in Spk, ‘the straightway’ refers to the Eightfold Path and the destination, nibbāna, is 
fearless because “there is nothing to fear in that and because there is no fear for one who has attained it” (cited in 
Bodhi trans. 2005: 376) 
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This is most often conceived in terms of arousing energy (vīriya) or a disturbed sense of 
urgency (saṃvega) in contemplative practice (AN5.77). Here is a typical example: 
Here, a forest disciple reflects thus: I am now dwelling all alone in the forest. But while I 
am living here, a snake might bite me, a scorpion might sting me, or a centipede might 
sting me. Because of that I might die, which would be an obstacle for me. Let me now 
arouse energy for the attainment of the as-yet-unattained, for the achievement of the as-
yet-unachieved, for the realization of the as-yet-unrealized (AN5.77) 
Several suttas additionally recommend the practice of ‘mindfulness of death’ (maraṇasati). In 
prominent versions, this involves approaching and meditating on skeletons and corpses in 
various stages of decay in such “awe-inspiring, horrifying abodes” (MN7) as charnel grounds 
and woodland shrines (MN10, MN119, SN46.57-61). These practices are distinctive to 
Buddhism and are elaborated throughout the tradition. The objective of meditating on such 
‘hideous and fearsome objects’ (Vism. 2.56), according to Buddhagosa, is to arouse a sense of 
urgency (saṃvega) in religious exertion.9 
 Here, then, emerges the paradox of fear in the broader Buddhist context of the Nikāyas. 
Fear is both a negative mental state that obstructs solitary practice and a positive state that 
galvanizes it. Disciples are advised to both arouse fear and vanquish it. How are these views 
to be reconciled? 
 
3 Giustarini and Brekke 
According to Giustarini (2012), the “seemingly contradictory nature of fear” (513) can be 
explained away if we conceive of the positive use of fear, on the one hand, and the goals of 
counteracting fear and fostering fearlessness, on the other, as “essential steps in the same 
process” (511) albeit at different stages. The Buddhist path to liberation, Giustarini argues, 
proceeds ‘against the stream’ (paṭiloma) and so the individual who walks this path needs to 
make an effort. Fear elicits this effort by first stimulating the individual to engage in 
contemplative practice and then deeply permeating their meditations “with a sense of urgency” 
(522). In this respect, fear is “a wise response to the presence of danger”, properly perceived 
(517). Guistarini claims, however, that even as a wise response to danger, fear involves an 
element of disturbance; it is “a form of suffering that must be extinguished by the practitioner.” 
(524). He concludes that “this stimulus is meant to become obsolete” for an individual who 
recognises this fact about fear (529). Fearlessness is the obsolescence of fear. 
 Giustarini thus offers an instrumental strategy in response to the paradox of fear. He treats 
fear as instrumental to practice and fearlessness as the redundancy of fear once that practice is 
complete. While something along these lines sounds right, it only works if you ignore those 
remarks in the Nikāyas that negatively characterise fear as an obstacle to the contemplative 
practice of a forest disciple. Giustarini’s proposal is thus not a solution to the paradox of fear, 
if by solution we mean an explanation that renders consistent the positive and negative 
 
9 Note that while prominent forms of ‘mindfulness of death’ involve fear-generation, this may not be necessary. 
There are various “ways of recollecting death” (Vims 8.7-8), which might support contemplative practice in 
different ways (see Vism. 8). It is also unnecessary that reflection on death should generate fear. The Buddha is 
recorded as reassuring at least one individual to “not be afraid” of death because his death “will not be a bad one” 
(SN 5.370-1) if he continues in good conduct. This example suggests that whether death should be feared is agent 
relative. What this agent-relativity amounts to needs explaining. This article will attempt to provide an 
explanation. 
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evaluations of fear and explains away the puzzle that arises from thinking of fear as motivating 
acts aimed at removing itself. The Nikāyas can shed some light on this last point, however. As 
mentioned, they frequently use the same term, bhaya, to denote both the object of fear (danger) 
and the psychological attitude or response to danger (fear). That Śāntideva also alternates these 
senses of bhaya is reflected in the competing translation choices for this term by scholars of 
BCA.10 While it is puzzling to think of inciting an aversive state to motivate acts aimed at 
removing itself, there is nothing strange in the idea of inciting an aversive state (fear) to 
motivate acts aimed at removing or averting its object (something dangerous). 
 Giustarini proposes that fear performs its motivational function by stimulating a sense of 
urgency (saṃvega) in individuals. This is supported by the literature cited in the previous 
section. Brekke (1999) makes a similar proposal. Both claim that the induction of fear is “a 
necessary step in the contemplative path” (Giustarini 2012: 517, my italics). This last claim is 
difficult to defend or refute. On the one hand, there is no textual evidence to support it; the 
actual or even frequent incitement of fear is insufficient proof of necessity. To disprove this 
claim, however, would require a counterexample; a case of someone who has attained nibbāna 
but was not initially motivated by fear. It is hard to find such an example. Gautama Buddha is 
our textbook case of someone who has achieved nibbāna, and he is said to have been initially 
motivated by saṃvega after seeing an old man, a sick man, and a corpse (see Bc ch.3, Thūp 
p.164). While it doesn’t follow from this that “fear is absolutely necessary” (Brekke 1999: 459) 
to stimulate contemplative practice, Buddhists clearly find it useful for this purpose. 
 Brekke contends that the Buddha and Buddhists incite fear for another purpose; namely, 
religious conversion. The “weapon of fear”, he argues, was “part of the missionary arsenal of 
Buddhists” (458) and is best treated as a proselytizing strategy. In support, Brekke cites several 
early Buddhist conversion stories which narrate the Buddha converting various peoples, human 
and non-human, to Buddhism (MN56, DN2, Mv1.15-20). Brekke is right that fear plays a 
motivating role in these contexts. Consider the following passage from the Mahāvaṃsa which 
describes the Buddha’s conversion of yakkhas11 on the island of Laṅkā:  
To this great gathering of that yakkhas went the Blessed One, and there, in the midst of that 
assembly, hovering in the air over their heads…, he struck terror into their hearts by rain, 
storm, darkness and so forth. The yakkhas, overwhelmed by fear, besought the fearless 
Vanquisher to release them from terrors, and the Vanquisher, destroyer of fear, spoke thus 
to the terrified yakkhas: ‘I will banish this your fear and your distress, O yakkhas, give ye 
here to me with one accord a place where I may sit down.’ The yakkhas thus answered the 
 
10 Crosby and Skilton (1998), for instance, translate bhaya as danger in BCA 2.54: “I have transgressed your 
command. Now at seeing the danger (bhaya), terrified (bhīto), I go to you for refuge. Destroy the danger (bhaya), 
quickly!” (p.18). Steinkellner & Peck-Kubaczek (2019) similarly translate bhaya as ‘peril’. But compare with 
Batchelor (1979) and Wallace & Wallace (1997) who translate it as ‘fear’: e.g. “Previously I transgressed your 
advice, but now upon seeing this great fear I go to you for refuge. In doing so may this fear be swiftly cleared 
away” (Batchelor 1979: 18); “After neglecting your counsel, in terror I go to you for refuge now as I face this 
fear. Swiftly remove my fear!” (Wallace & Wallace 1997: 27). Lest one object that this difference in translation 
turns on the fact that Wallace & Wallace and Batchelor are translating from the Tibetan rather than Sanskrit (as 
reflected in different verse numbering to Crosby & Skilton), Wallace & Wallace use ‘danger’ and Batchelor uses 
‘terror’ for bhaya in BCA 2.42; e.g. “Protectors, I, negligent and unaware of this danger, have acquired many 
vices out of attachment to this transient life” (Wallace & Wallace 1997: 26); “O Protectors! I, so unconcerned, 
unaware of such terror as this, accumulated a great deal of evil, for the sake of this transient life” (Batchelor 1979: 
16-17) 
11 Yakkhas (yakshas Skt.) are a broad class of woodland spirits or demons that appear in Hindu, Jain and Buddhist 
texts. See DeCaroli (2004) 
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Blessed One: ‘We all, O Lord, give you even the whole of our island. Give us release from 
our fear. (Mhv 1.23-27) 
It doesn’t follow, of course, that religious conversion is the only purpose for which Buddhists 
incite fear since, as Brekke acknowledges, it also stimulates the Buddha’s disciples in 
contemplative practice. Brekke’s emphasis on religious conversion nevertheless raises the 
question of whether this is what Śāntideva had in mind when he advises taking refuge in ‘the 
Buddhas and Bodhisattvas’. If so, it is hard to see how converting to Buddhism, by itself, could 
provide a remedy for fear since it was clearly insufficient for those disciples who ‘lost their 
minds’ (MN4.2) from fear during solitary forest practice. While I do think some kind of 
commitment or attitude of faith or trust is implied by Śāntideva’s notion of taking refuge (along 
the lines argued in Finnigan 2019), I also think that it has the potential to mean a lot more. The 
act or practice of ‘taking refuge’ has a long history in the Buddhist tradition. All major schools 
of Buddhism acknowledge three sources of refuge, known collectively as the Triple Gem. They 
are the Buddha, the Dhamma (or the ‘truth’ as taught by the Buddha, dharma, Skt.), and the 
Saṅgha (or the Buddhist community, saṃgha, Skt.). According to the Dhajaggasutta, the 
Triple Gem provides refuge from fear.  
“For those who thus recall the Buddha, The Dhamma, and the Saṅgha, disciples, no fear 
[bhaya] or trepidation [chambittata] will arise, Nor any grisly terror [lomahaṃsa]” 
(SN11.3).  
Śāntideva clearly acknowledges these three sources of refuge. “With as many prostrations as 
there are atoms in all the Buddha fields” he writes “I throw myself down before the Buddhas 
of all three times, before the Dharma, and before the highest assembly.” (BCA 2.24) If we 
extend Śāntideva’s conception of ‘taking refuge’ to include the Triple Gem, his advice implies 
a potentially richer and more complex explanation of how taking refuge might function to help 
individuals ‘transcend’ fear beyond mere commitment to Buddhism. This explanation will 
likely be informed by the philosophical dimensions of the Buddha’s teachings and supported 
by the social dimensions of the Buddhist community. Spelling it out will not be straightforward, 
however, since Buddhists disagree on the details.  
 An explanatory gap remains in the proposed solutions of Giustarini and Brekke. Central to 
the paradox of fear is the idea that fear is or can cause a “suitable response to a situation” that 
stimulates contemplative practice, and sometimes is or causes an “improper reaction” that 
impedes this same practice (Giustarini 2012: 523). What explains the difference? Giustarini 
does not say. According to Brekke “the solution to this puzzle is the fact that fear has very 
different functions under different circumstances: it is the talents and discipline of the 
individual that make the difference” (1999: 459). While something along these lines seems 
right, it also needs explanation. The Bhayabheravasutta has told us that fear impedes solitary 
practice for those with unwholesome mental states. It is reasonable to suppose that it galvanises 
practice for those with at least some wholesome states. But what are the relevant states and 
how do they relate to fear? Brekke does not say.  
 I have a positive proposal, inspired by ideas found in the Nikāya suttas. Before elaborating 
it, I will first give reasons against an alternative approach. The Nikāyas frequently identify and 
prescribe ‘fear of misconduct’ (ottappa) as a positive motive for action. Together with shame 
(hiri), ottappa is described by the Buddha as one of the “two bright qualities [that] protect the 
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world” (AN1.52) because it motivates restraint from wrongdoing.12 The pairing of ottappa 
(apatrāpya, Skt.) and hiri plays an important role in the moral psychology of later 
Abhidhamma/Abhidharma Buddhism. If ottappa were the sense of fear at issue in the paradox 
of fear, it might suggest an easy solution: ottappa is positive and prescribed as a suitable 
response to situations, whereas bhaya is negative and to be eschewed as an improper reaction. 
While ottappa is indeed positively conceived as, or as causing, a suitable response to certain 
situations,13 it is not the mental state at issue in the paradox of fear. Buddhagoṣa characterises 
ottappa as an aversive attitude to misconduct due to dread of social reproach (Dhs trsl. 126, 
Vism. 14.142). This is not relevant to the fears of solitary forest meditators discussed in the 
Nikāyas, nor does it exhaust the kind of fear prescribed and used by Śāntideva to motivate his 
audience to take refuge in the Bodhisattvas. Ottappa might be relevant to some cases but appeal 
to ottappa does not explain why bhaya (and its close cognates) is a suitable response in some 
cases but an improper reaction in others. The paradox of fear still stands. Identifying the role 
of ottappa in later Abhidhamma/Abhidharma nevertheless suggests that there is a richer moral 
psychology in Buddhist views about fear than engaged here.14 While I will now turn to advance 
my own solution to the paradox of fear, inspired by the Nikāya suttas, this solution is best 
understood as a preliminary step in a broader conversation about Buddhist views on the nature 
and function of fear. 
 
4. Resolving the Paradox 
According to the Bhayabheravasutta, fear impedes solitary practice for those with 
unwholesome mental states. It is reasonable to suppose that it may galvanise practice for those 
with at least some wholesome states. What are the relevant states and how do they relate to 
fear? Ṭhānissaro Bhikkhu suggests that the relevant mental states are delusion and wisdom 
(2016: 24). This has exegetical support. The Bahūdhatukasutta claims that whatever fears arise, 
they all arise because of the fool, not because of the wise man (MN115.2). What is the relevant 
cognitive object about which a disciple is deluded or has insight? The Dhammapada suggests 
that it is the presence of danger:  
“Seeing danger when there is no danger, and not seeing danger when there is danger, 
because of taking up wrong views, beings go to a bad state of rebirth.” (Dhp 317).  
Combining these ideas, we can derive the following proposal: fear impedes solitary practice 
for those who are deluded and thus mistaken about the presence of danger but galvanises it for 
those who are wise and thus rightly perceive its presence (see danger ‘as it actually is’, MN11).  
 On reflection, this proposal might seem wrong. Recall the peril of being killed by a wild 
animal. Disciples are advised to dwell on this peril, ardently and resolutely, until fear and a 
sense of urgency motivates them to increase their religious exertions (AN5.77). This is also a 
 
12 “If these two bright qualities did not protect the world there would not be seen here [any restraint regarding] 
one's mother, aunts, or the wives of one’s teachers and [other] respected people. The world would become 
promiscuous like goats and sheep, chickens, arid pigs, dogs, and jackals. But because these two bright qualities 
protect the world, there is seen here [restraint regarding] one's mother, aunts, or the wives of one's teachers and 
[other] respected people.” (AN1.52). 
13 There are divergent views, however, about whether ottappa is best analysed as a kind of fear or as ‘shame’ or 
‘a sense of decency’ (Ñāṇamoli 1964: 472; Lodrö Sangpo 2012: 518) 
14 I thank an anonymous reviewer for pressing me to engage this point. 
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peril that causes fear and dread to arise in disciples and robs them of their concentration 
(MN4.2). The object appears to be the same in these cases, both in general kind (danger) and 
particular instantiation (being killed by a wild animal). It might thus seem that the difference 
in response is not explicable in terms of a difference in ‘what’ is feared (what is ‘seen as’ 
dangerous). 
 A closer reading of the Nikāya suttas sheds some light here. Disciples are not actually 
advised to dwell on the danger of being killed by wild animals but, rather, on the ‘obstacle’ 
that being killed would cause: “Because of that I might die, which would be an obstacle for 
me.” (AN5.77). This is also true for the other potential sources of death. What obstacle could 
death cause? The answer is clearly meant to be that it would prevent contemplative practice 
and thus the achievement of nibbāna and escape from cyclic existence. What is so dangerous 
or fearsome about this? The answer, again, is that if one does not achieve nibbāna in this life, 
then one may not have an opportunity to do so in the next and so one will face karmic suffering 
in either the next life or some life thereafter. This includes the possibility of being reborn into 
one of a vast number of hell realms, each with their own distinctive forms of excruciating 
suffering (MN130). The Nikāya suttas thus appear to assume a refined conception of ‘danger’ 
and thus of the object of fear. The object of fear is danger, but an object is properly (actually, 
ultimately, truly) dangerous if causally related to karmic suffering. Call this the refined analysis 
of fear. Fear is or causes a wise response to a situation rather than an improper reaction, we 
might say, when the individual properly perceives the presence of danger. To properly perceive 
the presence of danger, however, is to realise, with a disturbed sense of urgency and aversion, 
that the object is a cause of karmic suffering.  
 This refined analysis of fear is exegetically informative. First, it explains why fear of ‘future 
perils’ positively motivates the arousal of energy and urgency in contemplative practice rather 
than some other aversive response to these objects. While there might be many ways to avoid 
the pain and suffering of, say, being mauled to death by a wild animal, the only way to avoid 
karmic suffering, according to Buddhism, is to follow the Buddha’s path to liberation.  
 Second, it explains why sensual pleasure is included in the list of future perils. Sensual 
pleasure (kāma) typically connotes sexual pleasure but includes any kind of bodily sensory 
enjoyment. Is it necessarily dangerous? Many of the other perils involve suffering, harm or 
death to an individual. A desire for sensual pleasure, by contrast, appears to have both negative 
and positive consequences depending on the context. The Majjima Nikāyas dwell at great 
length on its potential negative consequences, with graphic emphasis on interpersonal conflict 
(MN13, MN45). Yet it is also easy to think of cases where desire for sensual pleasure has 
positive outcomes such as pleasure for oneself and another when the desire is consensually 
satisfied, with the potential to cause further pleasure. As several suttas pointedly insist, 
however, sensual pleasures are impermanent and for this reason it is believed that their pursuit 
can and will lead to negative outcomes. We find several causal analyses of the underlying 
psychology to explain this view. A typical example can be reconstructed as follows: an 
individual associates sensual pleasure with some object (person, event, situation or thing), 
which then causes them to crave (taṇhā), cling or be attached (upadāna) to that object. This 
attachment then conditions the individual to experience suffering in the face of inevitable 
change or loss of that object, given the fact of impermanence, or frustration in the attempt to 
achieve or maintain the associated pleasure. Unless the individual cultivates wisdom, virtue, 
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and mindfulness, they will be motivated to act in various unwholesome ways to try to secure 
the object and associated pleasure, and to avoid the suffering associated with change. Even if 
these actions achieve their goal in the short or mid-term, they do not do so in the long-term 
because unwholesome actions generate karmic suffering. Sensual pleasure is thus a future peril 
because it motivates unwholesome actions that cause karmic suffering.15  
“[O]n the dissolution of the body, after death, [those who indulge in sensual pleasure] 
reappear in a state of deprivation, in an unhappy destination, in perdition, even in hell. 
There they feel painful, racking, piercing feelings. They thus say, ‘This is the future fear 
those good recluses and brahmins saw in sensual pleasures.” (MN45.3)  
Third, the refined analysis of fear helps explain away some apparent inconsistencies in 
Buddhist attitudes towards death. As we have seen, Śāntideva not only endorses fear of death 
as appropriate but his verses seem positively aimed at inciting fear of death in his audience. In 
the Sotāpattisaṃyutta, however, the Buddha explicitly reassures an individual, Mahānāma, to 
“not be afraid” of death. This might suggest that Śāntideva and the Buddha have inconsistent 
attitudes towards the appropriateness of fearing death. The inconsistency can be explained 
away if we contextualise their remarks to different prospects of karmic suffering. Śāntideva, 
for instance, relates fear of death to the karmic suffering likely to result from past misconduct 
(“Realizing you are like a captive fish, how right it is for you to be afraid right now? How much 
more so when you have committed evil action and are faced with the intense agonies of hell? 
(7.11)). The Buddha, by contrast, reassures Mahānāma not to fear death because, if he 
continues to engage in Buddhist practice, his “demise [viz. rebirth] will not be a bad one” (SN 
5.370-1). The evaluative differences between Śāntideva and the Buddha can thus be rendered 
consistent if fear of death is assumed to be agent-relative given the refined analysis of fear.  
 Fourth, the refined analysis of fear might help explain why a Buddha is considered to be 
fearless. Since a Buddha has achieved nibbāna, he clearly has no need to be motivated by fear 
to engage in practices aimed at achieving this goal. Fear, for a Buddha, has “become obsolete” 
(Giustarini 2012: 529). Giustarini also notes that fear is a subtle form of suffering and thus a 
“fetter that must be overcome” (529) on the path to liberation. A Buddha, for whom all 
suffering has ceased, no longer experiences fear. This still needs some explanation. On the 
refined analysis of fear, the object of fear is danger, and an object is properly dangerous if 
causally related to karmic suffering. A Buddha has achieved nibbāna, has escaped cyclic 
existence and is no longer subject to karmic suffering. A Buddha thus faces no danger, properly 
understood, and has nothing to fear.  
 This does not yet explain why a Buddha is fearless. Just because a Buddha has nothing to 
fear, properly speaking, does not necessarily mean that he doesn’t experience fear. This is 
because it is possible to fear things that are not actually or properly dangerous (think of the 
irrational fears of a child); to fear an object it is sufficient that you perceive (construe) it as 
being dangerous, whether or not it is dangerous in fact. To account for a Buddha’s lack of fear, 
an explanation is needed of how the fact that a Buddha is in no danger bears on his (or her) 
 
15  Not all forms of pleasure are said to be subject to this analysis. For instance, the Buddha of the 
Laṭukikopamasutta identifies and endorses various forms of pleasure or bliss that stem from contemplative 
practice (e.g. the bliss of renunciation, the bliss of seclusion, the bliss of peace, the bliss of enlightenment). “I say 
of this kind of pleasure that it should be pursued, that it should be developed, that it should be cultivated, that it 
should not be feared” (MN66.21) 
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subjective construal of not being in danger. The refined analysis of fear suggests an explanatory 
route, however. 
 Consider the Bhayabheravasutta, which recounts the Buddha’s efforts to conquer fear on 
the night of his enlightenment. It begins with the Buddha’s admission that, before his 
enlightenment, he thought that solitary forest meditation was hard to endure because fear and 
dread would arise to impede contemplative practice (MN4.3). He reflects further and attributes 
the arising of fear and dread to impurities of conduct and mind (MN4.4-19). He goes onto claim 
that he finds great solace in dwelling in the forest because he “sees in himself” the possession 
of wisdom (MN4.19) and purity of conduct (MN4.4-7). To test this idea, the Buddha proceeds 
to meditate in an “awe-inspiring, horrifying abode” (MN4.20) and recounts experiencing “fear 
and dread coming upon [him]” when the wind rustled the leaves or birds snapped twigs 
(MN4.20). He claims to have been able to “subdue” (MN4.22) this fear and terror each time it 
arose until his body and mind were sufficiently tranquil, untroubled, concentrated and unified 
to allow him to enter and abide in the various meditation stages towards enlightenment.  
 The Bhayabheravasutta does not explain how the Buddha’s awareness of possessing these 
wholesome qualities (‘seeing them in himself’) enabled him to subdue fear. The refined 
analysis of fear can help us make sense of it. Several suttas refer to awareness of possessing 
wisdom as relevant to social anxiety. The Buddha of the Mahāsīhanādasutta claims, for 
instance, that it is because he “sees no ground” (MN12.23) on which anyone could reproach 
him for being wrong in his understanding and teaching of the Dhamma that he “abide[s] in 
safety, fearlessness, and intrepidity” (MN12.30) and “roars his lions roar in the assemblies” 
(MN12.27). The Buddha’s awareness of possessing wisdom (and thus his awareness that his 
understanding and teaching of the Dhamma is correct) explains why he sees no ground or 
reason on which he could be reproached by others for speaking falsely. It makes sense to think 
that if one is completely assured of one’s views, all things considered, one will not be afraid to 
proclaim them publicly. This does not yet explain how being aware that one possesses wisdom 
or has purity of conduct might help one subdue fear in solitary practice. It nevertheless does 
provide grounds for an analogous argument. The Buddha, in his wisdom, understands that the 
object of fear, properly conceived, is danger related to karmic suffering. He also understands 
that pure conduct does not cause karmic suffering and he is aware that his conduct is pure. So, 
just as on account of being aware of possessing wisdom, the Buddha ‘sees no ground’ to fear 
the reproach of others and is thus fearless in social contexts, just so on account of being aware 
that he possesses wisdom (and the understanding about karma that it entails) and is also aware 
that his conduct is pure, the Buddha ‘sees no ground’ to fear karmic suffering and is thus 
fearless in his conduct.  
 No doubt this is a protracted and incomplete account of a Buddha’s fearlessness. It does not 
explain, for instance, the role of the various meditative attainments (jhānas) in achieving the 
cessation of karmic suffering and thus the achievement of nibbāna. Nor does it explain the 
function of the other elements of the Buddhist Eightfold Path for achieving fearlessness or how 
the aspects of the Buddha’s Dhamma relating to karma and cyclic existence, about which he is 
said to possess wisdom, relate to other aspects of his Dhamma, such as the doctrine of no-self 
(anatta). The above analysis might also introduce some new puzzles. For instance, the 
meditative attainments are thought to destroy the taints or residual causes of karmic suffering 
generated by past conduct (MN4.32). In contrast, the above account implies that awareness of 
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purity of conduct is a means to solitary practice (it enables the Buddha to subdue fear in order 
to engage in solitary practice) rather than being achieved by means of solitary practice. These 
considerations do not undermine the central point, however; that danger in relation to karmic 
suffering is the proper object of fear with respect to which a Buddha is fearless. 
 Here then is a more detailed exegetical solution to the paradox of fear that applies both to 
the early Buddhist teachings and its commentaries as well as to the writings of Śāntideva. Like 
Giustarini, I think that the positive incitement of fear is intended to be instrumental to practice 
and becomes redundant once the goals of this practice are achieved.16 Rather than motivating 
acts aimed at removing itself, which seems paradoxical, its purpose is to motivate practices 
aimed at removing danger, which is the object of fear. This does not yet explain why and how 
fear positively galvanises the practice of some disciples (and thus is or causes a wise response 
to a situation) while negatively impeding that of others (and thus is or causes an improper 
reaction). The refined analysis of fear helps here. While two distinct disciples engaged in 
solitary forest practice may experience fear in response to the same kind of situation (e.g. 
hearing woodland sounds and anticipating the attack of a wild animal), fear motivates different 
aversive responses due to different construals of the relevant danger. Fear impedes 
contemplative practice for the disciple who (only) sees danger in the suffering caused by being 
mauled to death by that animal, but it galvanises the practice of the disciple who possesses 
sufficient wisdom to realise that (1) death would obstruct their ability to avoid karmic suffering, 
(2) karmic suffering is the true danger to be averted, and (3) practice is the wisest aversive 
response to karmic suffering. Wisdom and the lack thereof inform these different construals of 
the relevant danger. Since wisdom is considered to be a wholesome quality and its lack 
(delusion) an unwholesome quality, it follows that these agent-relative qualities are the 
determining factor for whether fear impedes or galvanises contemplative practice.  
 Finally, with respect to resolving the paradox of fear, the above account can help explain 
why a Buddha is ‘altogether fearless’ (MN56.29) and not galvanised in contemplative practice 
by fear. Fear galvanises the response of a disciple who possesses sufficient wisdom to realise 
that (1) death would obstruct their ability to avoid karmic suffering, (2) karmic suffering is the 
true danger to be averted, and (3) practice is the wisest aversive response to karmic suffering. 
A Buddha, in their wisdom, not only realises (1-3) but they are also aware that their conduct is 
pure, that they have purified all karmic taints, and have thereby escaped the karmic cycle of 
rebirth. A Buddha is thus fearless because they realise that they are in no danger, properly 










16 I also grant Brekke’s claim that fear is sometimes used for the purpose of religious conversion, but I think that 
this is less philosophically interesting than the function of fear to galvanise Buddhist practice. 
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